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Abstract: The history of free will has yet to be written. With few exceptions, the literature on 
the subject is dominated by legal and philosophical works, most of which recount the ideas of 
prominent thinkers or discuss hypothetical questions far removed from specific historical 
contexts. The following paper seeks to redress the balance by tracing the debate on hypnosis 
in Germany from 1894 to 1936. Examining responses to hypnosis is tantamount to recording 
common understandings of autonomy and heteronomy, self-control and mind control, free 
will and automaticity. More specifically, it is possible to identify distinct philosophical 
positions related to the question as to whether hypnosis could surmount free will or not. The 
article demonstrates that the discourse often centered on the perceived struggle, located within 
a particular ‘personality’, between an individual’s ‘character’ or ‘soul’ and the infiltration by 
a foreign or hostile force. While one group (compatibilists) emphasized the resilience of the 
‘moral inhibitions’, another group (henceforth called determinists) doubted that these were 
sufficient to withstand hypnosis.   
 
 
In December 1894, the Upper Bavarian Jury Court debated the nature of free will. Ceslav 
Lubicz-Cynski, a Polish-born teacher, hypnotist, and magnetizer, stood accused of having 
unlawfully seduced Hedwig von Zedlitz, a ‘respectable’ and ‘devout’ Saxon baroness. 
According to the state prosecutor, Cynski had employed suggestion to bring about a state of 
abulia (Willenlosigkeit) in his victim. Lacking free will, Zedlitz could no longer resist the 
defendant’s advances. The court had to decide whether Cynski’s skill as a hypnotist was 
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responsible for a sexual crime (Verbrechen gegen die Sittlichkeit) or whether Zedlitz had 
simply fallen for the man’s foreign good looks. The Cynski affair, as it would be sometimes 
called, was the first legal proceeding in Germany to adjudicate the power of hypnosis as a 
technique to suspend free will.
1
 
     The history of free will has yet to be written. With few exceptions,
2
 the literature on the 
subject is dominated by legal and philosophical works, most of which recount the ideas of 
prominent thinkers or discuss hypothetical questions far removed from specific historical 
contexts.
3
 The following paper seeks to redress the balance by tracing the debate on hypnosis 
from 1894, when the Upper Bavarian Court deliberated Czynski’s culpability, to 1936, when 
the authorities considered a similar case in the Baden city of Heidelberg. Examining 
responses to hypnosis in this (and any other period) is tantamount to recording common 
understandings of autonomy and heteronomy, self-control and mind control, free will and 
automaticity.
4
 The neurologists, psychiatrists, and jurists about to be examined put forward 
two distinct perspectives on the matter, both of which conformed with recognizable 
philosophical positions: one group warned that the hypnotic state threatened to undermine the 
self-control upon which middle-class identity rested; the other believed that men (and women) 
of a certain character would be able to withstand hypnosis on account of their free will. The 
popularity of the second judgement, it will be argued, owed much to the way in which it 
reassured middle-class sensibilities: those who had developed a morally sovereign personality 
would retain their free will, whereas those who had not done so would be helpless in the face 
of hypnotic suggestion.   
     To this day, philosophers refer to hypnosis—alongside drug use, brain stimulation, and, 
archetypally, holding a gun to someone’s head—as a means of removing the capacity for free 
will,
5
 although their allusions to hypnosis are usually based on older, very much disputed 
conceptions of the phenomenon.
6
 German observers in the early twentieth century were often 
beholden to such conceptions.  Hypnosis was dangerous, they believed, precisely because it 
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could surmount free will. Cunning hypnotists used suggestion to seduce innocent women or 
force hapless victims to commit crimes in a posthypnotic state. For others, by contrast, free 
will would invariably prevail, no matter how powerful the hypnotic suggestion. Given the 
nature of the question, with its wider moral and philosophical implications, the conflict 
caused divisions both within and without the professional fields of psychology, psychiatry, 
and law. Indeed, the discourse often centered on the perceived struggle, located within a 
particular ‘personality’, between an individual’s ‘character’ or ‘soul’ and the infiltration by a 
foreign or hostile force. While one group (henceforth called compatibilists) emphasized the 
resilience of the ‘moral inhibitions’, another group (henceforth called determinists) doubted 
that these were sufficient to withstand hypnosis.   
     As will be noted, the above terms relate to the current scholarship on free will, which tends 
to distinguish between determinists, indeterminists, and compatibilists. Determinists profess 
that ‘a complete statement of the laws of nature together with a complete description of the 
condition of the entire universe at any point in time logically entails a complete description of 
the condition of the entire universe at another point in time’.7 Put differently, determinists 
believe that every physical event is ‘completely caused by prior events together with the laws 
of nature’.8 Determinists rely heavily on natural science (Newtonian physics in the past, 
neuroscience more recently) as well as (social) psychology.
9
 Indeterminists dispute this view, 
either because they avow that nature works in a probabilistic rather than a deterministic 
fashion;
10
 or because they differentiate between reasons and causes;
11
 or else because they 
believe in alternative possibilities (i.e. to act differently from the way one did) and therefore 
in free will. In the latter case they also call themselves libertarians.
12
 Compatibilists are 
situated somewhere in between, arguing that determinism and free will do not contradict each 
other. Compatibilists usually define determinism as being governed by our own preferences, 
personalities, or characters. Indeed, if we wish acts to be our acts, compatibilists insist, they 
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have to be determined by us. As long as behavior is unconstrained (by physical force from 
outside, for example), these acts are free.
13
 
     At first sight it would be reasonable to associate those who disputed the impact of hypnosis 
on free will with libertarianism rather than compatibilism. After all, the moral law, as defined 
by the most important German libertarian, Immanuel Kant, was to be unaffected by outside 
circumstances (i.e. the phenomenal world).
14
 But as my discussion will show, the issue was 
more complex than such a conflation would suggest. For in highlighting the significance of 
‘personality’, the ‘compatibilists’ were undermining the libertarian notion of an 
unencumbered mind freely willing rectitude, righteousness, and justice. Instead, they posited 
‘characters’ that had been socialized to either embrace or resist the allures of hypnotism. 
‘Character’, it followed, determined the way in which persons responded to hypnosis, 
allowing for the compatibility of free will and determinism. 
     It would be equally reasonable to identify those who accentuated the dangers of hypnosis 
with compatibilism rather than determinism. Here too, however, the matter was not quite as 
straightforward as it might first seem.  To be sure, the type of determinism I am about to 
elucidate stressed the impact of hypnosis on free will in a manner reminiscent of how ‘classic’ 
compatibilists such as David Hume stressed the importance of external constraints on human 
freedom. According to this view, freedom is ‘the absence of constraints preventing us from 
doing what we want’. The difference between Hume and the determinists we are about to 
encounter is not only that the former was solely concerned with external constraints on 
freedom like ‘physical restraint (being in jail or tied up), coercion or threats (holding a gun to 
someone’s head), or physical disabilities (such as paralysis)’, whereas the latter contemplated 
constraints internal to human wills (of a psychological or psychiatric kind, such as addictions, 
obsessions, or delusions).
15
 The main difference is that for the determinists hypnosis was not 
simply a constraint that undermined the full exercise of freedom though physical coercion or 
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by seriously affecting rational behavior. Instead, it had the force to extinguish the personality 
as such, invariably causing a certain kind of behavior to take place. 
 
I 
 
Debates on the possibility of committing crimes under the influence of (post-) hypnotic 
suggestion had been heated ever since the 1880s, not least because of Jules Liégeois’ 
interventions. Nancy’s public prosecutor believed that ‘any individual placed in a 
somnambulistic state will become in the hands of the experimenter a complete automaton, 
both morally and physically’.16 He therefore disseminated information on the dangers of  
‘suggestive crime’, warning women to avoid the gaze of unknown men in train compartments 
lest the ‘weaker sex’ succumb to the powers of ‘fascination’. The French administrative 
lawyer also recommended that exceptionally suggestible women be ‘morally immunized’ 
against hypnosis—whether he was aware of the irony that this ‘vaccination’ was to be 
achieved through suggestion is another matter. Either way, the media coverage on trials 
related to ‘rape’ as a result of ‘psychic slavery’ and ‘sexual dependence’ was extensive, not 
least in the Bavarian capital in late 1894.
17
  
     According to various press accounts of the trial, Baroness von Zedlitz had been suffering 
from severe head- and stomachaches when she responded to a newspaper ad by the ‘healer’ 
Czynski. Zedlitz and Czynski became intimate during the course of the treatment.  Czynksi 
asked that their subsequent engagement be kept secret from either side’s relatives, ostensibly 
because he belonged to a princely Lithuanian family that would not appreciate such news. 
Eventually, Zedlitz’s brother and father got wind of the marriage. Czynski was arrested and 
put on trial for forcing his ‘wife’ into a state of abulia (Willenlosigkeit). Lacking free will, the 
public prosecutor argued, Zedlitz had become the victim of sexual abuse.
18
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     During the proceedings, the court sought to identify the methods by which Czynski had 
gained control over the baroness’s psyche. There was talk of magnetic passes, mediumism, 
somnambulism, and disease transfer. The defendant repeatedly denied having hypnotized the 
injured party. It further transpired that the latter had been interested in spiritism. Zedlitz made 
conflicting statements. While she claimed to have married Czynksi ‘so as to save his soul’, 
her decision to tie the knot also gave rise to feelings of being under his ‘ever-growing 
influence’ (which she also attributed to his strong love for her).19 In the end, the public 
prosecutor failed to convince the jury. Czynski was acquitted of committing a sexual crime 
(Verbrechen gegen die Sittlichkeit) and sentenced to three years in prison for falsifying 
documents and soliciting the unlawful assumption of a public office during the wedding 
ceremony.
20
 
     The trial gave the expert witnesses the opportunity to address the nature of hypnosis. Their 
observations, which were later published in book form, provide a glimpse of what future 
debates would revolve around, namely the power of hypnosis over different types of people 
(i.e. hypnotizablity or suggestibility) and the impact of hypnosis on morality (i.e. free will). 
Three of the four commentators were convinced that Czynski had hypnotized Zedlitz, 
although as we now know the jury refused to uphold their recommendations. None of the 
commentators were straightforward determinists or libertarians. 
     Professor William Preyer, editor of James Braid’s works in German translation,21 was the 
most outspoken determinist in the group. A well-known expert on child psychology, the 
former professor of psychiatry at the University of Jena conjured up the image of Czynski as a 
master hypnotist who managed to ‘fascinate’ Zedlitz through his ‘dark eyes’ and ‘manner of 
speaking’.22 Still, Preyer described the baroness as an ‘emotional person’ (Gefühlsmensch) 
lacking will and intellect (Verstand). In fact, due to her substandard power of volition and 
poor judgement, he felt compelled to call her ‘somewhat inferior’ (etwas minderwertig).23 In 
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other words, as much as hypnosis was a powerful means to paralyze the will, it seemed to 
work better with some persons than others.  
     Hubert von Grashey, former professor of psychiatry in Würzburg and Bavaria’s senior 
medical officer (Obermedicinalrat), offered a similarly deterministic account of the events. 
Yet he too qualified his stance by referring to the limitations of hypnosis, admitting, for 
example, that increasing the number of hypnotic sessions (called Dressur or memory training 
elsewhere) increased the likelihood of suggestibility.
24
 Likewise, he repeatedly appealed to 
the accumulated experience (Erfahrungsschatz) of each person. Under normal circumstances 
(i.e. in a waking state), this know-how would produce ‘counter perceptions’ 
(Gegenvorstellungen) capable of withstanding immoral propositions.
25
 Nevertheless, Grashey 
made no bones about the general power of hypnosis, regardless of its relative depth or one’s 
Erfahrungsschatz in the waking state. During trance, when the hypnotist assumed absolute 
control over the hypnotisand, ‘counter-perceptions’ no longer succeeded. Indeed, all it took 
was a ‘single word’ or ‘single gaze’ for a medium to fall asleep. In the case of Baroness von 
Zedlitz, Czynski had evidently used certain terms (of an occult nature) and certain objects 
(primarily amulets) to induce hypnotic states, which, in turn, necessitated his ‘victim’ to fall 
in love with him. In short, everything Zedlitz had purportedly done ‘out of love’ was in reality 
the result of the diminution of her will.
26
 
     Ludwig Hirt, a former student of Jean-Martin Charcot’s in Paris and professor of 
neurology in Breslau,
 27
 questioned these interpretations of the Czynski case. Hirt explained 
that hypnosis was a technique that had to be studied carefully and developed over time. While 
he agreed with Grashey that repeated drill (Dressur) improved the chances of success, he 
insisted that only deep trance ensured a genuine susceptibility to suggestion.
28
 Despite his 
training in the French capital, Hirt did not embrace the Charcotian standpoint that hypnosis 
worked predominantly with (hysterical) women, a stance that Preyer’s and Grashey’s 
gendered language implied. Rather, he adopted the approach connected with Bernheim, 
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Charcot’s main rival. According to the founder of the School of Nancy, docile and compliant 
persons such as soldiers and servants were particularly vulnerable to suggestion.
29
 Hirt was 
convinced that individuals who had learned ‘not to think’ and to ‘obey orders’ were easier to 
hypnotize than most people. Since woman seldom served in the army, for example, they were 
less likely to respond to suggestion.
30
 The fact that many women served their husbands or 
worked as domestics in other households presumably did not count as the sort of 
submissiveness Hirt had in mind.  
     Even so, conflicting theories on suggestibility were not his primary concern. The Breslau 
psychiatrist told the court that love, pure and simple, accounted for the relationship between 
Czynski and Zedlitz. The middle-aged baroness, inexperienced with men, had merely 
capitulated to the ‘Mephistophelian’ charms of the Polish marriage swindler, Hirt asserted. 
Had she been 14 and not 39 years of age, Czynski would now be sent to jail. But to reason 
that the affair revealed something criminal or pathological meant that any behavior intended 
to ‘make a girl and a woman (Weib) more generally fall in love’ would soon become illegal. 
The state Zedlitz had found herself in reminded Hirt of Gretchen’s lament at the spinning 
wheel from Goethe’s Faust—and not some devious plot to deny Zedlitz her free will with the 
assistance of hypnotic procedures: ‘My poor, poor head/ Is all a-craze,/ And my poor wits/All 
in a maze.’ And:  ‘To see him only/ At the window I stay,/To meet him only/From home I 
stray.’31 
     The physician, psychotherapist, and parapsychologist Albert von Schrenck-Notzing was 
certainly the most prominent specialist to comment on the case. The co-founder of the 
Munich Psychological Society in 1886, Schrenck was not only one of Germany’s best-known 
medical hypnotists, but also a socialite who invited the city’s Honoratioren to psychic 
experiments that doubled as fashionable soirées. Upon discovering his skills as a hypnotist, 
Schrenck had come to believe that he was capable of ‘curing’ homosexuality and ‘undoing’ 
the effects of suggestion through counter-suggestion.
32
 His expert opinion during the trial 
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betrayed both a belief in the immense potential of hypnosis and the resolve to sustain a 
common morality. Unlike the other experts, however, he spelled out these contradictory 
elements in his expert opinion to the court.  
     On the one hand, Schrenck acknowledged the power of suggestion. Like Grashey, he 
spoke of the way in which hypnotic Dressur could weaken and ultimately overcome ‘ethical 
feelings’ (sittliches Gefühl), not least in connection with the ‘drives’, where it proved 
especially effective in surmounting ‘the resistance against sexual temptations’.33 Von Zedlitz 
had therefore been ‘artificially (through hypnosis, the aftermath of hypnosis, and suggestion 
in a waking state) prevented from exercising her otherwise highly developed moral counter 
conceptions (Gegenvorstellungen)’.34 On the other, he relativized the extent to which 
suggestions of a ‘disagreeable’ (unsympathisch) and ‘immoral’ nature might hold sway over 
human beings, insisting that a person’s entire upbringing—and, in the case of the baroness, 
decades of ‘cultivated ethical counter conceptions of normal individuality’—could not be so 
easily uprooted.
35
 As a result, a struggle would ensue, the outcome of which depended on the 
‘strength of the counter forces in comparison with the psychical force of the immoral 
intervention’.36 Schrenck-Notzing found it difficult to take sides. Although he sympathized 
with the determinists’ appreciation of hypnotic power, he wished to establish a much of 
stronger role for what Grashey had called Erfahrungsschatz and what later commentators 
would call the ‘moral inhibitions’. It was for this reason that he invoked an imaginary battle 
within the psyche, setting two formidable adversaries against each other and envisaging ‘free 
will’ as the exercise of a steadfastness grounded in ethical values accrued over a lifetime. 
Schrenck-Notzing’s battle metaphor pointed to future compatibilist arguments regarding free 
will and hypnosis. Grashey and Preyer, on the other hand, were determinists in the face of 
what they perceived to be the psychological constraints imposed on the ‘victims’ of hypnosis. 
Once in place, these constraints functioned like a natural law, resembling the automaticity that 
current determinists associate with the workings of the unconscious.
37
 There was no room for 
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libertarianism in these debates, however. Even specialists less perturbed by hypnotic power, 
such as Hirt, distinguished between simple ‘fascination’ and ‘serious’ deep trance.  
 
II 
 
These debates intensified in the late Wilhelmine Empire and even more so in the Weimar 
Republic. At a time when an ‘occult fever’ was supposedly engulfing German society,38 the 
relationship between hypnosis and crime consumed the nation in two separate areas: in the 
first, state authorities and the police began to resort to unorthodox methods (so-called 
‘criminal telepathy’) by employing clairvoyants in the fight against crime. Many of these men 
and women with ‘paranormal’ abilities relied on hypnosis to bring about their telepathic 
states.
39
 In the second, a number of high-profile court cases involved claims about hypnotic 
influence, the most famous of which centred on the sexual exploitation of a chambermaid by a 
writer and hypnotist.
40
 
     Much of this discourse turned on the question of free will and, more specifically, on the 
likelihood of hypnosis doing away with free will altogether. Before I outline the differences 
between compatibilists and determinists, mention must be made of a smaller group that 
neither espoused the optimism characteristic of the compatibilists nor the pessimism common 
to most determinists. Schrenck-Notzing belonged to this group. His battle metaphor drew 
heavily on Auguste Forel’s Der Hypnostismus, whose language he employed liberally. 
Schrenck, Forel, and the Bavarian magistrate Alois Heberle, amongst others, displayed a 
sense of uncertainty as to the power of hypnosis.
41
 Forel, Switzerland’s most famous 
psychiatrist and one the leading scholars in the field, wrote about an ‘intense struggle between 
the urge (Drang) of the suggestion on the one hand and the aesthetic or moral counter-
perceptions of normal individuality, that is, the inherited and the acquired brain dynamics 
(Hirndynamismen) on the other’. Whoever had a less developed conscience than the rest of 
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the population was bound to find it easier to abide by ‘criminal suggestion’.42 At the same 
time, Forel mentioned somnambulists who were highly hypnotizable and who were unable to 
resist any form of hypnotic suggestion. Some of these persons, he added, were ‘pretty decent 
characters’ (recht ordentliche Charaktere).43  
     Heberle, a lawyer from the south German city of Passau, was similarly undecided. A critic 
of Cesare Lombroso’s deterministic theory of degeneration (which threatened to erode moral 
responsibility and free will),
44
 Heberle resorted to the familiar trope of a battle waged 
between two equally mighty contenders, the suggestion to sleep emanating from without and 
the autosuggestion not to sleep emanating from within.
 45
 Like Forel and Schrenck-Notzing, 
he insisted that the degree to which a criminal would succeed with his hypnotic suggestions 
would depend on the moral character of the potential medium. The more drill (Dressur) was 
involved, the likelier the surrender to the evildoer.
46
 All three commentators were therefore 
ambivalent about the abuse of hypnosis in a criminal setting. As much as they held on to the 
notion that moral standards could underwrite free will, they simultaneously feared that 
hypnosis could undermine these moral standards and, by implication, free will. Forel 
conducted oft-quoted experiments to prove this point.
47
 Such ambivalence, however, was 
much less common after the First World War, whether in the Weimar Republic or the Third 
Reich. 
     The compatibilists focused on the authority of the inhibitions (Hemmungen) and counter-
perceptions (Gegenvorstellungen), both of which, they believed, comprised the average 
middle class ‘character’ as a kind of ‘overall matrix or frame of personal being’.48 Before they 
could do so, however, they often felt obliged to dismiss the pervasive concern that hypnosis 
was responsible for all kinds of illicit acts.
49
 Since the Czynksi affair of the mid-1890s, sexual 
assaults on ill-fated women had been the most talked-about ‘hypnotic crime’, possibly 
because few if any other cases had come to light that would have ‘documented’ further 
offenses at the hands of master hypnotists.
50
 But now, at a time when films such as Das 
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Cabinet des Dr. Caligari or Mabuse, der Spieler captivated (and, as some critics warned, 
mesmerized) cinema-goers,
 51
 there was an urgent need to dispel the ‘misunderstanding’ that 
hypnosis wielded colossal power. 
     So compatibilists maintained that ‘hypnosis’ was used as a pretext to explain events that 
could otherwise not be accounted for;
52
 that, more concretely, it figured as an excuse for 
compulsive sexual acts (Triebhandlungen) that were embarrassing to admit, either because 
they seemed to disclose a depraved mind or because they could not be imagined to exist in the 
persons one loved;
53
 and, finally, that when women or their husbands complained that they or 
their wives had been hypnotized, they often mistook hypnosis for sexual dependence 
(Hörigkeit), infatuation, or fascination.
54
 In short, whenever Germans blamed hypnosis for 
these and other ills, they were giving in to what later historians would call ‘hypnotizzy’, 
rather than experiencing actual hypnotic suggestion.
55
 
     Whatever the power of hypnosis, the ‘personality’ or ‘character’ of the average German 
usually sufficed to counteract suggestions that disagreed with the moral code of the individual 
in question. What is more, this personality was the very reason for being able to exercise free 
will in the first place. If the character did not conform to the standards of bourgeois probity, 
however, then the hypnotist could do his (it was always a male) malevolent work. None the 
less, he could do so not because of the hypnotic suggestion itself, but because of the existence 
of an inferior character. Put differently, just as free will vis-à-vis hypnosis was present in the 
case of morally upright mediums, so too was the absence of free will already in place in the 
case of morally corrupt mediums. Compatibilists assumed that, at one point in time, 
characters had been formed and could no longer be altered. But the dispute among 
philosophers as to the free will that went into forming these characters did not perturb them. 
Whether free actions were always implicated during the process of becoming who one was 
did not matter.
56
 On the contrary, when confronted with the subject of hypnotic power, the 
compatibilists assumed that being good was synonymous with free will, as the ethical person 
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could decide between accepting the criminal suggestion or not, whereas the unethical person 
did not enjoy this choice at all. In other words, the unethical person, however much he may 
have had the opportunity to make certain choices in the past, was now a helpless automaton 
insofar as he acted upon a foreign will. 
     This perspective anticipated Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order and second-
order desires. Frankfurt discriminated between someone having the intention to perform a 
given action but then doing something different despite her erstwhile intention. In this 
instance she decided as a result of a second-order desire or a volition of the second-order. For 
the American philosopher, having such volitions was the equivalent of being a person. 
Creatures lacking such desires he called wantons. As he put it, the ‘essential characteristic of 
a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do things, without its 
being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be 
moved by other desires.’ So the difference between a person and a wanton is that where the 
person is moved to act either by a will she wants or by a will she does not want, the wanton 
does not reflect on the whether his will is the will he wishes to act upon.
57
 
     The group that championed a Frankfurt-like approach in the post-war period included 
lawyers, doctors, hypnotists, and psychiatrists. More importantly, their writings appeared 
before and after 1933, indicating that National Socialism in power did little to alter 
fundamental positions on the matter. Let me begin with the writer and lay hypnotist Paul 
Friede, for whom the ‘core of the soul’ was ‘unswayable’ (unbeeinflussbar).58 Writing in the 
early 1920s, Friede explained that suggestions during hypnosis resembled the ‘extraction’ of 
ideas, perceptions, and thoughts that already existed in the unconscious. It followed that 
hypnotists and psychotherapists relied on the ‘essence of this unconscious’, whose contents 
they could bring to light, but never manipulate or overcome.
59
 What would happen to the 
drives, impulses, and appetites uncovered during hypnosis depended solely on the patient. 
Since most ethical human beings could call upon a host of ‘inhibitions’ (Hemmungen) to rein 
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in their drives, there was no danger in succumbing to the malicious intent of real or imagined 
criminal masterminds. Suggestions would only be accepted, the author noted, if they 
corresponded to the innermost contents of the medium’s ‘soul’ (Seeleninhalt).60 Friede was 
convinced that every ‘normal person endowed with moral inhibitions’ would refuse to carry 
out any act that he or she found unjust.
61
  
     It appears that Friede was the only figure to locate the ‘moral inhibitions’ in the 
unconscious, although his conception of the unconscious derived not from Freud, but from 
Max Dessoir’s Doppel-Ich, where hypnosis and the unconscious are analogous and where the 
latter is hardly associated with morality.
62
 Most like-minded scholars did not attempt to 
discriminate between components of the psyche, being primarily interested in publicizing the 
significance of free will irrespective of where it might be situated.
63
  
     Writing at about the same time as Friede, the well-known Freiburg neurologist and 
psychiatrist Adolf A. Friedländer averred that hypnosis did not threaten a person’s ‘character’, 
‘fundamental ethical foundations’ (sittliche Grundbegriffe), or ‘world view’ 
(Weltanschauung).
64
 This statement applied to the morally steadfast and morally degraded 
alike. As was common during this time, Friedländer appealed to a tradition reaching back at 
least to Hippolyte Taine’s The Origins of Contemporary France and Gustave Le Bon’s The 
Crowd, where the unconscious was not mentioned in name but existed in the ‘wild forces of 
nature’ released during the events of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. The 
discharge of these wild forces, Le Bon had warned time and again, often depended on the 
skills of dubious figures.
65
 In a similar vein, Friedländer believed that it did not require 
hypnosis for the masses to be ‘inflamed’, approximating as they did the emotional level of an 
immature child. Accordingly, whoever mastered the ‘art of mass psychology’ would be able 
‘do with the masses as he saw fit’.66 
     Other doctors and psychiatrists agreed.
67
 But this position was not confined to hypnotists 
or the medical profession. The criminal defence lawyer Werner Lucas sounded very much 
  
Negotiating Free Will 
 
  
15 
like Friede when he asserted somewhat categorically that hypnotizing someone against her 
‘express will’ was ‘out of the question’.68 Referring to the soul (Seelenleben) rather than 
specific sections of the mind, he reiterated the argument that ‘character, custom, education, 
and under certain circumstances religious considerations (Rücksichten)’ could produce moral 
inhibitions (Hemmungen).
69
 He juxtaposed persons with recourse to such inhibitions against 
‘hysterical and morally feeble persons lacking character’ (characterschwach), who were 
inclined to commit crimes anyway—that is, with or without hypnosis.70 Although he admitted 
that repeated suggestions (Dressur) and cunning lies could overcome even moral inhibitions 
associated with ‘shame’ (in women), Lucas clearly believed that these were exceptions that 
proved the rule.   
     Like many other compatibilists, the Berlin lawyer Hellmut Ivers did not deny the extent to 
which hypnosis was able to produce ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ perceptions that could, in turn, 
lead to delusional behavior on the part of the hypnotisand.
71
 Agreeing with Lucas on the 
importance of ‘character’, he spelled out in even greater detail the differences between those 
who were at risk and those who had little to fear from hypnosis. The former group comprised 
people with ‘reduced intellectual independent-mindedness’.72 The lower the level of 
education and the less developed the ‘ethical qualities’ attached to higher forms of education, 
the more difficult it would be to resist hypnosis.
73
 It followed that the latter group was, if not 
immune to the allures of hypnosis, at least morally responsible to persevere in the face of the 
temptation. In fact, just as it would be near-impossible to induce a ‘normal’ person to commit 
murder, so a patriotic man would never commit treason. Suggestion might prompt a ‘well-
behaved’ woman to ignore the pain of a needle or to believe that a non-existent bunch of 
flowers smelled beautifully, but it could not cause her to undress in front of an audience.
74
 As 
a jurist, Ivers was not only concerned with delimiting the power of hypnosis, but equally 
interested in reminding ‘normal’ Germans that it was imperative to withstand particular 
suggestions. The ethical foundations common to most educated people, in other words, had to 
  
Negotiating Free Will 
 
  
16 
be activated in certain situations, as it was simply not enough to rely on a good upbringing 
only.
75
 Even so, this upbringing distinguished the average middle class person from her 
morally depraved counterparts, because she was moved to act either by a will she wanted or 
by a will she did not want. 
     The determinists did not describe the victims of hypnotic suggestion as wantons who were 
incapable of making decisions based on moral reflection. Rather, they argued that hypnosis 
was similar to a force of nature whose laws could not be changed. Some determinists held on 
to the hope that inhibitions in the unconscious might be tapped to uphold morality, but their 
general approach revealed a much more pessimistic outlook. Fritz Paas, whose legal 
dissertation on the subject appeared in 1933, was one of many who highlighted the risks of 
criminal activities in a state of post-hypnotic suggestion.
76
 He rejected the view that 
experiments which had apparently confirmed the efficacy of hypnosis to provoke such acts 
were methodologically flawed on the grounds that the respective medium knew very well that 
he or she was ‘performing’ within an artificial setting. Yet his objection to this serious caveat, 
voiced repeatedly throughout the twentieth century,
77
 was not particularly instructive, as he 
merely reminded his readers that in one such experiment the medium had dressed up all in red 
with chamois horns attached to his forehead.
78
 Paas stood firm in his belief that the victims of 
hypnosis were in a state of unconsciousness, unaware of what they were doing, and therefore 
non compos mentis (unzurechnungsfähig).
79
 More importantly, although he suggested that 
certain people, such as soldiers, children, and servants,
80
 were more easily hypnotized than 
others, he did not stipulate that the rest of society remained unaffected by attempts to 
surmount their free will.
81
 On the contrary, the notion that ‘character’ determined 
hypnotizability would have undermined his larger claim that hypnosis was a serious threat to 
society.  
     Like Paas, the physician Wilhelm Bergmann argued that certain traits or dispositions 
facilitated hypnotizability. People ‘too lazy too think’ (denkfaule), including soldiers and 
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servants, were much more prone to accept suggestions than others.
82
 Again, however, this 
supposed proclivity did not preclude the impact of hypnosis on the rest of society. Bergmann 
explained that a skilled hypnotist could outmanoeuvre any moral compunctions the medium 
might have. He brought up the possibility of making an odious deed appear to be completely 
ordinary. Asking an honest man to steal a pocketknife, for example, had no chance of 
succeeding, but convincing the same person that the knife on someone else’s desk was her 
own did enable the potentially evil hypnotist to carry out his devious plans.
83
 This argument 
relied heavily on experiments carried out by August Forel.
84
  
     Once under the influence of hypnosis, a person’s free will no longer functioned properly. 
According to Bergmann, this abdication of independence was a result of the single-
mindedness that came with hypnotic suggestion. Normally, in a waking state, emotions, 
senses, and thoughts of all kinds existed side by side. In a trance state, by contrast, the focus 
was on one thing only, to the detriment of ‘counter perceptions’ that would usually prevent 
the passive acceptance of certain ‘implanted’ desires or appetites.85 Hypnotic suggestion, 
Bergmann contended, was tantamount to reducing or cancelling associative thought 
processes, leading to the ‘uncritical acceptance’ of specific ideas.86 
     The neurologist Erich Kindborg agreed. Writing in Germany’s preeminent journal of 
psychiatry, he maintained that the success or failure of post-hypnotic crime depended entirely 
on the technique at someone’s disposal. An adept hypnotist could easily suggest that adultery 
was in someone’s best interest, for instance. Relying on the good works of the so-called moral 
inhibitions, the psychiatrist warned, was rather careless, all the more so since, like dreams, the 
hypnotic state consisted of perceptions wholly unrelated to each other—the implication being 
that the nastier perceptions could not be held in check by the more benign ones.
87
 Kindborg 
also referred to Forel’s experiments. The latter’s observations, although made under 
laboratory conditions, indicated that an ‘unconscious awareness’ of the artificial nature of the 
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setting (and thus the inconsequential nature of one’s actions during these experiments) was no 
guarantee that serious crimes could not be committed in a (post)hypnotic state.
88
 
     The dispute between compatibilists and determinists continued unabated after Hitler came 
to power. Despite widespread fears in the 1920s and 30s that hypnosis was about to transform 
radically common perceptions about human volition, academic discourse did not follow suit. 
The parallel with the situation in late nineteenth-century France and Germany is instructive. 
During this period too there were calls to severely curtail the use of hypnosis and confine its 
practice to trained physicians only.
89
 Yet as the Czynski Trial demonstrated, the experts could 
not agree on the extent to which hypnosis did indeed pose an imminent threat to free will. 
While popular imagery shifted with the times—from vulnerable women in train 
comportments to vulnerable publics in the grip of advanced technology controlled by evil 
masterminds—, the debate amongst neurologists, psychiatrists, and jurists did not change 
significantly. This is also true for the Heidelberg Trial of 1936, when for the first time a 
German court ruled that hypnosis had altered the character of a person and led her to commit 
a series of crimes. As much as the outcome of the trial differed from the one in Munich, it 
failed to convince the compatibilist faction that hypnosis could suppress free will altogether. 
 
III 
 
The circumstances of the case were reminiscent of nineteenth-century tales. Alice E., 
seventeen years of age and unmarried, met Franz Xaver Walter on a train ride to her future 
parents-in-law in 1927. When Ms. E. mentioned she was suffering from a stomachache, 
Walter claimed to be able to heal her with the help of homeopathy and naturopathy. Upon 
departing the train at the next station, he invited her for a cup of coffee. In the course of their 
exchange, Walter suddenly held her hand, which, she later remarked, made her feel incapable 
of exercising her free will. In subsequent weeks and months, Alice was asked to meet him in 
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Karlsruhe or Heidelberg, where he ostensibly treated her, although she could not recall any 
therapy sessions. In subsequent years, Alice paid Walter 3000 marks in fees; began sexual 
relations with Walter as well as several other men, including his ‘accomplice’ Karl Hermann 
Bodner; attempted several times to murder her husband, whom she had married in 1929; and 
tried to commit suicide. Her husband eventually contacted the police in the late summer of 
1934. Some two years later, Walter and Bodner were tried and found guilty of having 
sexually abused Alice E. in a state of abulia as well as having instigated crimes their victim 
failed to carry out successfully.
90
 They received jail sentences of ten and four years 
respectively. 
     The case relied almost exclusively on the expertise provided by Ludwig Mayer. The 
Heidelberg neurologist had already published a standard text on hypnosis in 1934.
91
 He 
subsequently produced two films on the subject for the Reich Office for Educational Films 
(Reichsstelle für den Unterrichtsfilm), one of which anticipated his central argument during 
the proceedings in 1937, namely that crime in a state of hypnosis was possible.
92
 Mayer 
produced an account of the trial that reiterated this point in some detail. 
     Some of the key claims put forward in this work recall earlier pronouncements on the 
subject. Mayer’s conception of the unconscious derived from Dessoir’s distinction between an 
Ober- and an Unterbewusstsein, where the latter figured as a disconnected entity that led ‘a 
life of its own’.93 Dichotomizing the two permitted Mayer to contemplate split personalities 
with distinct sensibilities.
94
 In the case of Alice E., Mayer believed to have identified two 
‘wholly separate wills (Willensgebiete), two memories, [and] two levels of consciousness’ 
that existed ‘side by side simultaneously’. She would therefore behave in one way in her 
conscious state and in another way in her unconscious state.
95
 Mayer agreed with Paas, 
Bergmann, and Kindborg that, while a person’s specific character indeed facilitated 
hypnotizability,
96
 ‘character’ in and of itself was not sufficient to impede hypnotic suggestion. 
If suggestions were chosen in such a way as to conceal true intentions (recall Bergmann’s 
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example of the pocket knife and Kindborg’s reference to adultery), then forcing people to 
commit crimes in a post-hypnotic state could not be ruled out, especially if they were 
subjected to ‘deep somnambulism’ during which they were no longer capable of resorting to 
residual inhibitions.
97
  
     It might be assumed that Mayer’s influence over the proceedings in Heidelberg and his 
role in the production of two educational films for a National Socialist state agency marked a 
break with the past. Yet most academic reactions suggest otherwise. Aside from Albert 
Hellwig, a well-known jurist and anti-occultist from Berlin, the majority of commentators 
doubted Mayer’s version of events. Hellwig repeated Mayer’s narrative according to which 
Alice E. was the first case to prove empirically (and not merely theoretically or 
experimentally) that hypnotic drill (Dressur) could suspend free will and induce a special 
post-hypnotic state, allowing the hypnotist to instigate criminal behavior in otherwise morally 
impeccable people.
98
 But even Hellwig has some reservations. Echoing Friede’s compatibilist 
viewpoint, he wrote that the hypnotist could induce actions that were incompatible with 
someone’s ‘conscious personality’, but never crimes that were irreconcilable with the 
‘unconscious personality’.99 
     Hans Bürger-Prinz, professor of psychiatry in Hamburg and Mayer’s most prominent 
critic, questioned much of what the Heidelberg neurologist believed to be incontrovertible 
evidence. Some of his counter arguments were hardly new. First, hypnosis was a ‘popular 
excuse for sexual acts (Triebhandlungen)’ that people found inexplicable or troubling. 
Invoking ‘hypnosis’ was thus a relief for men whose fiancées had been involved with other 
partners. Alice E., Bürger-Prinz explained, had behaved in a similar fashion: in order to 
appear innocent, unblemished, and irreproachable, she conveniently referred to hypnosis as 
the only possible reason for her sexual relationships and attempted murders.
100
 Second, even 
if her story proved to be true, there was no indication to suggest that Alice had not in fact 
agreed with the procedures used ‘against’ her, since hypnosis could not succeed without the 
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corporation of the hypnotisand.
101
 As a compatibilist, Bürger-Prinz assumed that Ms. E’s 
character had predisposed her towards accepting Walter’s instructions. This interpretation 
prefigured later social psychological research that would emphasize patients’ expectations 
(i.e. understanding of task demands) in given hypnotic contexts.
102
 Third, Bürger-Prinz 
wondered why, if Walter had hypnotized his ‘victim’ so successfully, Alice’s many attempts 
at killing her husband or taking her own life invariably failed.
103
 Although the Hamburg 
psychiatrist did not elaborate, this point reinforced his earlier compatibilist argument 
inasmuch as Alice not having committed murder or suicide, despite extensive hypnotic 
Dressur, testified to the resilience of her ‘virtuous’ character. Fritz Knigge, director of 
psychiatry at Hamburg-Langenhorn, supported his colleague, as did the Charité’s Johannes 
Kirchhoff. Where Knigge insisted that ‘criminal suggestions’ would hardly succeed without a 
hypnotisand’s ‘criminal proclivities’,104 Kirchhoff reminded his readers that the Heidelberg 
case was a good example of ‘sexual dependence (Hörigkeit)’, a possibility that Mayer had 
refused to mention in his account of Alice E.
105
 This final piece, published in 1944, put to a 
close the discussion of free will and hypnosis from the Kaiserreich to the Nazi years.  
 
IV 
 
Several reasons have been advanced to explain compatibilism’s appeal to philosophers. 
Perhaps the most important one refers to the fact that compatibilism offers a combination of 
determinism (in the shape of personal preferences or traits) and freedom (especially from 
physical coercion). This coalescence, the argument goes, allows for both the human need to 
acknowledge causation and the human need to administer justice.
106
 If, by contrast, characters 
and motives did not determine behaviour, it would be impossible to hold human beings 
responsible for their actions.
107
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     The German discourse on hypnosis and crime in the early twentieth century seldom 
involved philosophical reflection, but we can still detect an overall preference for 
compatibilist-like answers to the question of whether hypnosis could suspend free will. This 
preference was most evident in the writings of a group of neurologists, psychiatrists, and 
jurists who sought to preserve the notion of choice in the ‘contest’ with the hypnotic 
‘challenge’. Members of this group associated choice with ‘good’ character and ‘good’ 
character with the ability to decide to act according to a will freely chosen. ‘Bad’ characters, 
on the other hand, had no recourse to this decision-making process. Unlike their exemplary 
counterparts, they had been determined in such a way as to always will crime, the potential 
effect of hypnosis notwithstanding. Even determinists for whom hypnosis resembled a force 
of nature whose power could not be resisted admitted that character could indeed play a role 
in regard to hypnotizability. Soldiers and servants, some determinists believed, were more 
suggestible than the rest of the population, although the rest of the population remained very 
much at risk from hypnosis. This qualification paid homage to the strength of the 
compatibilist view. 
     From an abstract, philosophical perspective, the concept of free will is crucial for 
underwriting responsibility. In the context of early twentieth-century Germany, negotiating 
free will was not only a philosophical question, but also an issue that touched on the very self-
understanding of middle-class Germans. Both compatibilists and determinists demonstrated 
the way in which bourgeois norms affected their responses to hypnosis. Determinists warned 
that the hypnotic state, as an event outside human control, threatened to undermine the self-
control upon which middle-class identity rested.
108
 In claiming that servants, soldiers, and 
women were more prone to hypnotizability, determinists also relied on the familiar middle-
class trope that identified ‘impassioned’ women and the ‘lower orders’ with the inability to 
exercise the necessary restraint associated with bourgeois composure.
109
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     Compatibilists were more optimistic. By establishing a connection between the continued 
exercise of free will and middle class values, the compatibilist faction believed to vindicate 
the preeminence of morality and the rule of law in the face of the hypnotic ‘danger’. If 
hypnosis simply confirmed the moral degradation of certain people—whoever succumbed to 
hypnosis did so on account of a personality that had never developed the capacity for free 
will—, then the threat posed by hypnosis could be confined to outliers whose characters were 
flawed from the outset. Like Harry Frankfurt’s wantons, these persons lacked an interest in 
their wills because they had never cultivated a sense of being beyond first-order desires. 
Reponses to hypnosis, according to this reading, simply confirmed the extent to which free 
will depended on character. The character in question, however, was that of middle-class men 
whose impregnability in the face of the hypnotic challenge owed to their bourgeois training, 
above all the development of a ‘morally sovereign subjecthood’.110  
     Despite the transformations of German society in the early twentieth century, including the 
upheavals of 1918/19 that would do away with the ‘bourgeois’ nineteenth century, the 
discussion on free will illustrates the tenacity of certain principles amongst middle-class 
elites. As much as the social model attached to Bürgerlichkeit had vanished and as much as 
the ‘staid’ politics of moderation and compromise were being called into question,111 central 
aspects of the so-called ‘bourgeois value system’ (Wertehimmel, literally value heaven) 
persisted, especially the belief in the independent and self-regulated individual.
112
 As this 
essay has tried to show, negotiating free will in this period was also an attempt to reassure 
oneself that, no matter what the political persuasion and no matter what the political 
circumstances, free will belonged to those whose character had been formed in harmony with 
the very conditions that made free will possible. 
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